COMMENT
THE INEVITABLE INTERPLAY OF TITLE VII
AND THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT:
A NEW ROLE FOR THE NLRB
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1935 Congress enacted the National Labor Relations
Act' (hereinafter NLRA) to promote labor peace by "encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining . . . for
the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of ... employment."' 2 The collective bargaining of labor unions, as representatives of the employees, and employers was viewed as a
statutorily protected means to achieve the congressional purpose of labor peace and the "free flow of commerce,"3 after a
stormy period of labor relations had rocked the nation's economy. Almost thirty years later, after an equally turbulent period
in American life, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 19644
to provide for means to achieve a much hoped for racial peace.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19645 prohibited both em-6
ployer and labor union discriminatory employment practices
in the hope of securing equal employment opportunity. 7 At the
time of its enactment there was some concern that Title VII
might affect seniority rights8 created by collective bargaining
agreements as well as some of the remedies available under the
NLRA. 9 Although the supporters of the Title VII bill managed
to convince their opponents during congressional debate that
there was no danger of Title VII interference with the NLRA
and its protected interests, recent developments in the law, 10
and changes in social and economic conditions since the time of
enactment, have presented several areas in which the acts may
'49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141 et seq. (1970).
2 49 Stat. 449-50 § 1 (1935).
3 49 Stat. 449 § 1 (1935).
4 42 U.S.C. § 2000a et seq. (1970).
5 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1970), as amended, (Supp. II, 1972).
6 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1970).
7 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
8 110 CONG. REC. 7207, 7213-14, 7217 (1964).
9Id.
10 Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 94 S. Ct. 1011 (1974); NLRB v. Mansion
House Center Management Corp., 473 F.2d 471 (8th Cir. 1973); Jubilee Mfg. Co.,
82 L.R.R.M. 1482 (1973).
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conflict or overlap, both in purpose and in administration and
enforcement.
The conflict between Title VII and the NLRA can be characterized as both substantive and procedural. While the NLRA
generally protects collective bargaining agreements that are
bargained for in good faith under the terms of the Act, many
federal court decisions have intruded upon those agreements
by finding violations of section 703 of Title VII"I in the implementation of bargained for seniority plans.' 2 A union which
has bargained with the same employer for many years may regard a seniority plan as a "vested" system which is predictable
and dependable and which works well to satisfy the individuals
within a particular bargaining group. But, if a seniority system,
even of long standing, results in discrimination 1 3 against an in14
dividual for any of the proscribed reasons under Title VII,

then the whole system may have to be modified, no matter how
successful it may have been for the group in the past. Thus, one
of the substantive rights believed to be most protected under
the NLRA has been dramatically undercut by the pre-eminent
need to protect individual rights guaranteed by Title VII.
The legal debate over seniority rights and Title VII guarantees is not purely abstract; it must be understood in the context
of contemporary economic and societal developments. The
economic contraction and unemployment of the post-Vietnam
War period have emphasized the importance of seniority rights
as well as the fragility of equal employment opportunity
guarantees. Strict adherence to seniority plans will mean that
"last hired" blacks, women, and other minorities will be the
"first fired,"' 5 and all that has been accomplished 6 in the past
decade of equal employment opportunity under Title VII will
be undermined. Where the decisional law of Title VII may be
inadequate to deal with this problem, the processes under the
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1970).
12 See, e.g., Local 189, United Papermakers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir.

1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970); Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp.
505 (E.D. Va. 1968).
13 Throughout this Comment "racial discrimination" will be used generically for
all types of employment discrimination prohibited by Title VII. "Blacks" can be read
to incorporate by analogy women, national origin minorities, and other groups protected under the Act. For a case involving a seniority system held to be discriminatory
on the basis of sex, see Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 272 F. Supp. 332 (S.D. Ind.
1967), aff'd, 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969).
14 Race, color, religion, sex or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1970).
'- See note 52 infra; Bender,JobDiscrimination, 10 Years Later, N.Y. Times, Nov. 10,
1974, § 3, at 1, col. 1.
16 See Cooper & Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under FairEmployment Laws: A General
Approach To Objective Critariaof Hiringand Promotion, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1603 (1969).
Some have argued that not very much has been accomplished at all. See H. RODGERS
& C. BULLOCK, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE 113-17, 132-34 (1972).

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 123:158

NLRA might be utilized to help both employers and unions
meet new legal obligations imposed by a deteriorating economic situation.
In addition to the substantive problems posed by the differing impact of the two acts upon seniority rights, another
source of possible conflict arises from the involvement of the
NLRA in prohibiting racial and sexual discrimination in duty of
fair representation actions, 1 7 unfair labor practice proceedings, 1 8 and union certification proceedings' 9 as well as in arbitration-grievance procedures set up by collective bargaining
agreements. 20 Thus, the NLRA provides additional forums
and different procedural rules for addressing the problems
of employment discrimination explicitly covered by Title VII.
The potential for confusion and conflict when different procedures are used by multiple forums in considering similar
issues of employment discrimination, albeit in dissimilar settings, is manifest.
Several recent cases have highlighted how these inherent
tensions might affect treatment of employment discrimination
cases under the NLRA. In NLRB v. Mansion House Center Management Corp.2 1 the Eighth Circuit held that, as a federal agency,
the NLRB cannot require an employer to bargain 22 with a
union that practices racial discrimination because to do so
would be to participate in the discrimination in violation of the
due process clause of the fifth amendment.2 3 Where the employer properly raises the discrimination of the union as a defense to an 8(a)(5) charge,2 4 the NLRB must inquire into
whether the union has satisfied its obligation not to discriminate. 25 A union found to discriminate cannot avail itself of the
'7 See Int'l Metal Workers, Local 1, 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964) (Hughes Tool Co.);
cf. Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 337 (1953); Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R.,
323 U.S. 192 (1944).
'5 See Local 12, United Rubber Workers, 150 N.L.R.B. 312 (1964), enforced, 368
F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967); cf. Miranda Fuel Co., 140
N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
" See Hughes Tool Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964); Pioneer Bus Co., 140 N.L.R.B.
54 (1962).
10 CLIO Educ. Ass'n, 61 LAB. ARB. 37 (1973).
21 473 F.2d 471 (8th Cir. 1973).
22 To issue a bargaining order under § 8(a)(5) would, under the court's theory,
involve a federal agency in complicity in the discrimination. Cf. Shelley v. Kraemer,
334 U.S. 1 (1948).
2' 473 F.2d at 473.
24 Discrimination by the union is not per se an 8(b)(1)(A) violation. Id. at 474.
11 Since Mansion House rested on constitutional grounds the standards for discrimination would not necessarily be the same as Title VII discrimination, i.e., sex is not
a suspect classification under the equal protection clause, Frontiero v. Richardson,
93 S. Ct. 1764 (1973), so the NLRB might have to apply different standards for race
and sex discrimination.
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Board's (or the court's) powers to compel an employer to bargain with it, even if it is the employees' exclusive bargaining
representative.
However, in Jubilee Manufacturing Co.

26

the NLRB refused

to find an employer's alleged sex discrimination to be an unfair
labor practice as long as there was no nexus of interference
with the employees' section 7 rights. 27 The decision appears to
contradict the earlier decision of the D.C. Circuit in Packinghouse Workers v. NLRB 28 which held that an employer's racial
discrimination constituted an unfair labor practice because it
interfered with the employees' section 7 rights.
Most recently, in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,29 the Supreme Court held that arbitration of an employment discrimination grievance is not a bar to a separate Title VII lawsuit although the latter would involve essentially the same issues. The
Court also held that the federal labor policy of judicial deference to arbitral decisions3" would not apply in such a suit because the arbitrator's concern for the "industrial common law of
the shop" might be inconsistent with the employment discrimination "law of the land."' 31 According the usual weight to the arbitrator's decision, the Court feared, would undermine Congress' delegation of final responsibility for enforcement of Title
VII rights to the federal courts. Thus arbitrators may become
less involved in claims of employment discrimination while the
NLRB is given an expanding role in the area.
These recent cases frame novel questions in this context
for litigators of employment discrimination cases, as well as for
labor unions, employers, and the government: To what extent
must the substantive law of Title VII be read into the rules and
procedures of the NLRA and its instrument, the collective bargaining agreement? To what extent do the requirements of
Title VII restrict labor policies and practices protected by the
NLRA? To what extent can NLRA procedures and rules be
used to supplement and enforce Title VII policy?
This Comment will attempt to answer these questions, first,
by examining the impact of Title VII law on seniority and, second, by tracing NLRA treatment of employment discrimination. It will be argued that in the area of seniority, where cur26 82

L.R.R.M. 1482 (1973).
82 L.R.R.M. at 1484.
28 416 F.2d 1126 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 903 (1969).
29 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
27

30See, e.g., Steelworkers Trilogy: United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363

U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574
(1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
31 415 U.S. at 55-60.
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rent Title VII case law remedies may be inadequate, the NLRB
has a new role to play in avoiding conflicts between the two acts.
Finally, suggestions will be made for a rethinking of national
labor policy in light of the interplay of these acts.
II.

SENIORITY

RIGHTS AND TITLE

VII

A. The Significance of Seniority
Seniority plans, found in over ninety percent of all American collective bargaining agreements, 32 have been among the
most sought after terms and conditions of employment. "More
than any other provision of the collective agreement,... seniority affects the economic security of the individual employee
covered by its terms. '33 The general principle of all seniority
systems is that preference will be given to the employee with
the plant, the department,
the greatest length of service within
34
the line of progression, or the job.
Labor has generally demanded seniority because it places
objective restraints on employer action, provides predictability
for the employee, and furnishes the union leadership with a
standard with which to determine individual employee disputes. 35 Seniority systems are not without their advantages to
employers as well and have traditionally been agreed to because
they provide management with a useful training system for employees (where progression in a sequence of jobs determines
promotion), an incentive system to retain employees (ensuring
loyalty to the company as well as to the union), and an efficient
and orderly system for allocating work and making what would
otherwise be time-consuming ad hoc decisions. 3 6 Thus, seniority systems have been freely bargained for and freely agreed to.
Although it is now fairly clear that seniority rights are not
"vested" property rights, 37 employees, employers, and Congress seem to regard seniority as something which has been
"earned" and should not lightly be disturbed. The exemption
32 BNA,

BASIC PATTERNS IN UNION CONTRACTS, 75:1-75:2, 75:8-75:10 (5th ed.

1961); Cooper & Sobol, supra note 16; Note, Employment Discrimination and Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1109, 1156 (1971).
" Aaron, Reflections on the Legal Nature and Enforceability of Seniority Rights, 75
HARV. L. REV. 1532, 1535 (1962).

14 Most of the problems of employment discrimination have involved departmental
or job seniority as applied to transfers and promotions. Id.
" Cooper & Sobol, supra note 16, at 1604-05.
36 Cf. id. 1606-07.

37 See, e.g., Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505, 516-21 (E.D. Va.
1968); Aaron, supra note 33, at 1541-42; text accompanying notes 44-46. "The union,
however, has broad discretion to bargain for changes in existing seniority arrangements, even though the changes seriously curtail the expectations of some employees
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given to "bona fide" seniority plans under Title VII, 38 according to its proponents, was necessary to protect these very special rights thought to be earned or "guaranteed" by the NLRA.
While seniority has generally been thought desirable because of its objectivity as a work allocation device, that "objectivity" is offensive to federal law when the seniority system is
based on discriminatory hiring practices. A seniority system
based on length of service, no matter how neutral on its face, is
clearly not neutral in effect where blacks have been unable to
accumulate working time on a job or in a department for which
they were not, until recently, hired. Hence, a seniority system
which is based on work performed during any period in which
hiring (or transfer or promotion) discrimination existed, even
if before the effective date of Title VII, will be a perpetuation of past discrimination resulting in present and future
discrimination.3 9
Legislative intent as to the effect of Title VII on seniority
systems incorporated into collective bargaining contracts is
sketchy at best.40 The proviso to section 703(h), 41 exempting
"bona fide" seniority systems, does not exempt discriminatory
seniority systems. Since Congress did not specify exactly which
seniority systems would be exempt and which would not, this
determination has been left to the EEOC and the federal courts
in applying the broad mandate of Title VII. 42 While Congress
recognized the potential for conflict between Title VII and
seniority rights established under the NLRA, 43 it abdicated,
.... " Note, Title VII, Seniority Discrimination,and the Incumbent Negro, 80 HARV. L. REv.
1260, 1264 (1967).
38 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970) provides, inter alia:
[I]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system ... provided
that such differences are not the result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin ....
39 Local 189, United Papermakers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970). For a more detailed discussion of cases holding that
seemingly neutral seniority rules violate Title VII because they perpetuate past discrimination, see Cooper & Sobol, supra note 16, at 1615-29; Note, supra note 32, at
1160-64.
40 For a detailed discussion of the legislative history, see Cooper & Sobol, supra note
16, at 1607-14.
41 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970); see note 38 supra.
42 Cooper & Sobol, supra note 16 at 1614:
Congress made little effort to list or otherwise predetermine the specific conduct that would be illegal under the Act. Thus, courts must base many of their
judgments on the broad policies of the statute. Congress seems to have contemplated the judicial development of a "common law" of unfair employment
practices.
43 "Nothing in title VII ... affects rights and obligations under the NLRA .... No
court order issued under title VII could affect the status of a labor organization under
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instead of resolving the conflict, leaving to the courts the task
of exposing and attempting to reconcile the tensions between
the two acts.
B. The Ineffectiveness of the Current Remedial Approach
The greatest potential for conflict between the rights
created by both acts is felt by courts in fashioning remedies in
Title VII cases where a new seniority plan is ordered and the
collective bargaining agreement must be modified. It is now
clear that the provisions of collective bargaining agreements, no
matter how often renegotiated, are alterable 4 4 as a result of outside contingencies 45 and by agreement of the parties. Hence,
it is not so extraordinary a break from labor law that courts
have ordered relief resulting in modifications of the collective
bargaining agreement: "The departmental seniority rights
of white employees in the fabrication department are not
vested, indefeasible rights. They are expectancies derived
from the collective
bargaining agreement, and are subject to
46
modification.

the National Labor Relations Act . . .or deny to any union the benefits to which it is
entitled under those statutes. 110 CONG. REC. 7207 (1964) (interpretative memorandum
on Title VII submitted by Justice Department). "[T]he bill would not affect seniority
at all. It would not affect the present operation of any part of the National Labor Relations Act or rights under existing labor laws." Id. (remarks of Senator Clark). It seems
entirely plausible that Congress had envisioned concurrent jurisdiction for the Board
and the courts in situations in which discrimination involved labor disputes, and sole
jurisdiction for the courts in cases of employment discrimination where no labor union
or collective bargaining unit was involved.
44See Note, supra note 37, at 1264.
45Aaron, supra note 33, at 1542.
46Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505, 520 (E.D. Va. 1968). The order
in Quarles specified: "The company and the union shall be restrained from enforcing
directly or indirectly any provision of any collective bargaining agreement or practice
or from taking any other action which conflicts with the terms of this decree." Id. at 521.
In reacting to what the Fifth Circuit regarded as an in terroreum argument of the union
against "destruction of the collective bargaining agreement" the court said:
That hoary collective bargaining agreements now mandate perpetuation of
past aberrations from the governmental policy does not affect the propriety
of judicial action. . . .Such agreements do not, per se, carry the authoritative
imprimatur and moral force of sacred scripture . . . . Under the Railway La-

bor Act, federal courts have had the power to protect employees against invidious discrimination .... Under the National Labor Relations Act, they have
exercised an identical power .... Title VII has expanded the scope of judicial
inquiry and augmented the power of remedial relief in cases involving discriminatory employment practices ....
When the current effects of past-and sometimes present-racial discrimination in entities subject to the National Labor Relations Act have come
to our attention, this court has unhesitatingly required affirmative remedial
relief.
United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418, 454-55 (5th Cir. 1971).
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Almost every seniority case decided under Title VII thus
far has been brought by a class of plaintiffs seeking promotion
or transfer.47 The plaintiffs were already employed and sought
to improve their work or rate of pay. Within this setting, three
remedial schemes have been advanced: The "status quo" approach would preserve the seniority rights of whites in every
case except where the system was discriminatory on its face,
and would not remedy the effect of a system which presently
perpetuated past discrimination. The "freedom now" approach
would displace white incumbents with blacks who, but for the
discrimination they had suffered, would have had their
49
places. 4 8 Finally, the current approach, the "rightful place"
remedy, would grant blacks who have been discriminated against
the right to compete for a transfer or promotion on the basis of
plantwide or company employment rather than job or departmental seniority.
When accompanied by backpay, the use of the "rightful
place" remedy has been adequate to increase job opportunity,
compensate for past discrimination, and ensure future employment security. In an expansionary economic setting, whatever
conflict may have existed over "vested" seniority rights, the
most the incumbents lost was the certainty or probability of getting a better job. They could still compete for that job and could
win it on the basis of seniority rights as long as they were not
competing against an otherwise senior worker who had been
subjected to discrimination.
Future lawsuits against employers and unions will probably
grow out of layoffs, computed from discriminatory seniority
plans, during the recession and economic contraction of the
early seventies, post-Vietnam period. With these different eco50
nomic circumstances, present remedies must be re-evaluated
and new remedies may be needed. More radical remedies are
likely to collide, however, with the employment security expectations of incumbents in a much more dramatic and problematic way.
The difficulty may be illustrated by an example, not altogether fictional, of a large, nationally based defense contractor,
Company, that experienced great expansion and increased employment opportunities during the Vietnam War. 5 1 From 1964
47

But see Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 272 F. Supp. 332 (S.D. Ind. 1967).
4'Note, supra note 32, at 1158.
49Note, supra note 37
50Adams, Krislov, Lairson, Plantwide Seniority, Black Employment, and Employer Affirmative Action, 26 IND. & LAB. REL.REV. 686 (1972).
51Compare the similar factual setting of Watkins v. United Steelworkers Local
2369, 7 CCH EMP. PRAc. DEC.
9130 (E.D. La., Jan. 14, 1974), appeal docketed, No.
74-2604, 5th Cir., June 21, 1974.
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on, Company began hiring blacks, women, and other minorities
in order to comply with Title VII, 52 and was party to a collective
bargaining agreement that provided for layoffs and recalls on
a company employment seniority basis. By 1974, after termination of the Vietnam conflict and reductions in the space program, Company's work has diminished considerably and it wants
to lay off a sizable portion of its work force. A large percentage
of the employees with low seniority are the blacks and others,
hired in the post-1964 period, who were not hired earlier only
because of Company's discriminatory hiring policies. If they are
laid off now, they are victims of the "present perpetuation of
past discrimination" held to be violative of Title VII in the
transfer and promotion cases. 5 3 The "rightful place" remedy of
plantwide seniority will do these workers no good because the
plantwide seniority system is the instrument perpetuating the
discrimination.
Title VII case law does not provide a solution to this problem, 5 4 nor does the language of the Act itself. While it might be
argued that the seniority system used to lay off the workers is a
"bona fide" seniority system because it is not based on a racial
classification and does not discriminate intentionally, the argument should be rejected when the effect of using such a seniority schedule is no more "accidental" 55 than the effect of the
seniority schedules in the transfer and promotion cases: at the
time the employer and the union agreed on the seniority layoff
provision they knew what the probable racial consequences
would be. 56 If one agrees that the seniority plan is not a protected "bona fide" seniority plan under section 703(h) and that
the plan is in violation of sections 703(a) and 7 03(c) of the Act,
then the difficult question of remedy is reached.
C. The "Freedom Now" Approach
One possible remedy is based on the "freedom now"
theory. It could be argued that discriminatory layoffs are qual52 This analysis is based on Title VII and not on OFCC (Office of Federal Contract Compliance) "affirmative action" requirements which, under Exec. Order No.
11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965 comp.), and Exec. Order No. 11,375, 3 C.F.R. 320
(1967 comp.), would make the necessity of a "freedom now" remedy even more compelling on federal contractors.
53See text accompanying notes 57-59 infra.
54This inadequacy of Title VII remedies is lessened, of course, when the "rightful place" approach is rejected in favor of the "freedom now" remedy. There is some
movement in this direction. Where the plant-wide seniority already exists, the "rightful place" approach can afford no relief even in promotion cases.
55Cooper & Sobol, supra note 16, at 1674-75. See also Local 189, United Papermakers
v. United States, 416 F.2d 980, 995-96 n.15 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919
(1970).
56See Cooper & Sobol, supra note 16, at 1674-75.
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itatively different from transfers and promotions and justify
imposition of a "freedom now" remedy, meaning the displacement of white incumbents with blacks. To do otherwise would
be to "treat the recently hired and governmentally twice emancipated Blacks as persons who once again [have] to go to the
foot of the line. '57 Such an argument would be based on the
"but for" aspect of the white incumbents' expectations: "Where
some employees now have lower expectations than their coworkers because of the influence of one of these forbidden factors, they are entitled to have their expectations raised even if
the expectations of others must be lowered in order to achieve
the statutorily mandated equality of opportunity. '5 8 To lay off
blacks at this point would create a spiraling effect, increasing
the economic disabilities resulting from
the discrimination
59
thought to be remedied by the 1964 Act.
The ordering of such a remedy would, however, raise other legal issues under Title VII. Would a modification of the
plantwide seniority system used for layoffs constitute unlawful

"preferential treatment" proscribed by section 703(j) 60 of the

Act? If the statute is construed narrowly it could be argued that
the provision applies only to quota systems, used to correct "an
imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number or
percentage of persons of any race . ...
-"1 The remedy proposed here is not intended to achieve a general racial balance in
the place of employment itself, but to provide relief for both
particular individuals and the victimized class whose interests
62
have been harmed by past actions prohibited by the Act.
Moreover, preferential treatment remedies have been upheld
in employment discrimination cases when they were found to
57Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 457 F.2d 348, 358 (5th Cir. 1972).
Racial discrimination in employment is one of the most deplorable forms of
discrimination known to our society, for it deals not with just an individual's
sharing in the "outer benefits" of being an American citizen, but rather the
ability to provide decently for one's family in a job or profession for which
he qualifies and chooses.
Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 421 F.2d 888, 891 (5th Cir. 1970). Itis this concern
-the ability to provide for one's family-that distinguishes the layoffs from transfers.
Since the economic stakes are so crucial in the layoff context, more affirmative remedies designed to lessen the impact on those who are least able to bear the burdens are
justified. For a discussion of the considerations involved in determining who is in the
"affected class" of workers discriminated against for purposes of fashioning relief, see
Cooper & Sobol, supra note 16, at 1634-35.
58Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 800 (4th Cir. 1971).
5

9 See H. RODGERS & C. BULLOCK, supra note 16.

60 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1970).
6142 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1970).
62 See Cooper & Sobol, supra note 16, at 1634-35. Although relatively new minority
hires will not be the same persons who were directly harmed by past discrimination,
particularly in a layoff situation, class relief may be justified where previous discrimi-
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be reasonable. 63 Furthermore, the Act gives the courts power to
order "such affirmative action as may be appropriate, '64 and
the courts have already expressed their willingness to go furthparroting the Act's prohibitions" by granting
er than "simply
65
injunctions.
While a "freedom now" remedy may be justified by the
policy of the Civil Rights Act, the ultimate success of such a
remedy might be threatened by the racial tensions it would be
likely to provoke. 66 A new labor battleground could threaten
our "labor peace." However, procedures and additional remedies under the NLRA might be used to legitimize such remedies
and to work out solutions that would satisfy all the affected
parties: "It is possible that traditional procedures, protected by
the National Labor Relations Act, may aid in the equitable allocation of the costs of the overriding task of providing equal
employment to black workers. Black workers might well support such
an effort, in order to promote unity and reduce back67
lash."

D. Freedom Now Remedies in an NLRA Framework
Several alternatives can be considered. First, the collective
bargaining process provided for by the NLRA could be used to
force bargaining of nondiscriminatory or compensatory seniority and work allocation systems. Several proposals have already
been suggested: 68 (1) Layoffs could be based on chronological
age, giving to each black worker the average seniority of work-

nation was conducted on a class basis. See discussion of this point in Watkins v. United
9130, 6746-47 (E.D. La., Jan. 14,
Steelworkers Local 2369, 7 CCH EMP. PRAc. DEC.

1974), appeal docketed, No. 74-2604, 5th Cir., June 21, 1974.
63 Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971) (rehearing en banc), cert. denied,

406 U.S. 950 (1972).
A recent decision represents the most complete judicial acceptance to date of the
"freedom now" remedial approach. In Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 43 U.S.L.W.
2160-61 (E.D. Va., Sept. 25, 1974), Judge Bryan ordered that black and female employees "bump" white employees from their jobs where the white employee had
seniority for the job by virtue of past discriminatory hiring and promotions. The
company was ordered to fill supervisory positions only with black and female workers
until their representation in the supervisory workforce approximated the percentages
of black and female membership in the working population of the area.
6442 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1970).

65Local 53, Int'l Ass'n of Heat Workers v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047, 1052 (5th Cir.
1969).
66Some courts have been so concerned about the possibility of adverse effects
on white seniority rights of a Title VII order that they have ordered joinder of all white
employees whose seniority rights might be affected. English v. Seaboard Coast Line
R.R., 465 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1972).
67 Cooper & Sobol, supra note 16, at 1679.
68 Id. at 1635-36.
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ers in his age bracket. 69 The advantage of this proposal is that
it preserves the seniority system virtually intact and gradually
ceases to be a "compensatory" scheme as the young workers accumulate "real" seniority. (2) Seniority could be "wholly inverted, with the oldest employees laid off first but paid nearly
full wages during their absence. '70 (3) Employees to be laid off
could be selected by lot. 7' (4) Layoffs could be apportioned
among whites and blacks on the basis of the proportion of each
group in the total work force. (5) Finally, the system most likely
to preserve the "labor peace" of national labor policy as well as
the social and psychological wellbeing of the individual worker
would be a "sharing" of available work by all workers by reducing the work week during a slack period. Refusal by an employer or a union to agree to such a nondiscriminatory plan could
be challenged in an 8(a)(5) or 8(b)(3) proceeding 72 under the
NLRA.
Second, the NLRA machinery could be used to prevent
discrimination before it occurs, or before the affected individuals bring a lawsuit to challenge the discrimination, through
the NLRB proceedings of certification and unfair labor practices. Finally, the arbitration process might be utilized to a
limited extent 73 to deal with problems of employment discrimination.
One thing is clear: prior seniority precedent in the transfer
and promotion cases under Title VII is unequal to the task of
remedying discriminatory layoffs based on seniority systems
which perpetuate past discrimination. In such cases, seniority
systems and the collective bargaining agreement are put to their
severest test. Rather than exacerbate such a potential conflict
between the rights created by Title VII and the NLRA, the
processes of the NLRA should be used to reconcile the com69

Id.at 1635. This suggestion, however, may raise problems of age discrimination
which is prohibited by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C.
§ 621 et seq., as amended, Pub. L. No. 93-259, effective May 1, 1974. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2)
makes it unlawful for an employer to "limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of an individual's
age .... " The Act, does exempt bona fide seniority systems, 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2)
(1970), but tying seniority to chronological age would seem to contravene the core
provision of the statute.
70 Cooper & Sobol, supra note 16, at 1635. This plan has been suggested by the
UAW. See Bus. WEEK, March 29, 1969, at 82. The plan could be paid for out of a pension fund, or a plan of recession insurance could be developed, bargained for, and
made part of the contract.
71 Cooper & Sobol, supra note 16, at 1635.
7229 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), 158(b)(3) (1970).
73See text accompanying note 153 infra; cf. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415
U.S. 36 (1974).
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peting rights of employment opportunity and employment
security in a way that will promote "labor peace." The next
section will examine the appropriateness, perhaps the necessity, of such a function for the NLRA.
III.

THE APPROPRIATENESS OF THE NLRA AS A MECHANISM
FOR ACHIEVING EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY

The NLRB has traditionally been an agency expert in
reconciling differences between employers and unions. The
Board might therefore be able to apply its expertise to the task
of reconciling the differences between discriminated-against
employees on one side and the employer and other employees
on the other.74 If the NLRB handles employment discrimination disputes, the question remains what standards the NLRB
should apply: Must Title VII be fully incorporated into the
NLRA? Three recent cases, 75 all from different sectors of the
labor law judiciary, have attempted to answer this question.
A.

76

The NLRA and Racial Discrimination

1. The CollateralRelief of the Early Years
The courts, not the NLRB, first linked the racial discrimination of unions7 7 to the labor statutes. In Steele v. Louisville &
Nashville R.R. 7 8 the Supreme Court declared that unions had a
duty to represent fairly all the employees for whom it had statutory authority to act as exclusive bargaining representative
under the Railway Labor Act. 79 The union, which had bargained for a discriminatory contract, was ordered to represent
nonunion or minority union members "without hostile discrim71The NLRB's expertise in dealing with discriminatory discharges (on the basis
of union affiliation) in 8(a)(3) proceedings might indeed be helpful in the racial discrimination area.
75Cases cited note 10 supra.
76For a thorough discussion of the NLRA and racial discrimination prior to 1965,
see M. SovERN, LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT (1966);
Sovern, The National Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination, 62 COLUM. L. REV.
563 (1962).
'7 For an historical discussion, see F.R. MARSHALL, THE NEGRO AND ORGANIZED
LABOR (1965); H. NORTHRUP, ORGANIZED LABOR AND THE NEGRO (1944); S. SPERO &
A. HARRIS, THE BLACK WORKER (1966); THE NEGRO AND THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT

(Jacobson ed. 1968).
78323 U.S. 192 (1944).
79The Steele decision rested on a statutory, not a constitutional, basis. The court
reasoned that an act authorizing a union to be the exclusive bargaining representative
for all employees meant that the union could not favor some employees over others.

A concurring opinion would have based the decision on the fifth amendment of the
Censtitution: the NLRA being an act of Congress, no union authorized to act as exclusive bargaining agent under it could deny those it represented equal protection.
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ination, fairly, impartially, and in good faith. 8 0° Although the
Court recognized that unions would sometimes have to differentiate between different classes of workers,8 1 discrimination
based on race was "irrelevant and invidious. 8 2 The duty of fair
representation was held to apply under section 9(a) of the
NLRA8 3 as well as under the Railway Labor Act, but for many
years the duty was enforced through the courts, not the
Board.8 4 During this period the NLRB restricted its action to
withholding or revoking certain statutory benefits from unions
that discriminated on a racial basis. For example, where a union
had executed a discriminatory contract, the Board has revoked
and allowed an election sought by an outside
certification
85
union.
The NLRA has also been interpreted to grant protection to
employee concerted activity protesting alleged racial discrimination. This is based on a Supreme Court holding that picketing by a group of blacks in protest of discrimination in employment constituted a "labor dispute" immune from injunction
under the Norris-LaGuardia Act:
The desire for fair and equitable conditions of employment on the part of persons of any race, color, or
persuasion, and the removal of discriminations against
them by reason of their race or religious beliefs is
quite as important to those concerned as fairness
and equity in terms and conditions of employment
can be to trade or craft unions or any form of labor
80 323 U.S. at 204. The duty of fair representation has subsequently been found to
have been breached by executing a discriminatory contract or separate contract for
white and black employees, Pioneer Bus Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 54 (1962), or by refusing to
consider a grievance filed by an employee, because of his race, Hughes Tool Co., 147
N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964). But see Hairston v. McLean Trucking Co., 6 F.E.P. CAs. 779
(M.D.N.C. 1972).
8 323 U.S. at 203:

Variations in the terms of the contract based on differences relevant to the authorized purposes of the contract in conditions to which they are to be applied, such as differences in seniority, the type of work performed, the competence and skill with which it is performed, are within the scope of the bargaining representation of a craft, all of whose members are not identical in
their
interest or merit.
82

Id.

Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248, 255 (1944). See also Syres v. Local 23, Oil
Workers, 350 U.S. 892, rev'g mem. 223 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1955); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953).
84 Sovern, supra note 76, at 611. This is because most of the duty of fair representation cases arose under the Railway Labor Act, over which the Board did not have
jurisdiction.
85Int'l Metal Workers, Local 1, 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964) (Hughes Tool Co.);
Pioneer Bus Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 54 (1962). For a thorough discussion of the range of
sanctions available to the Board, See M. SOVERN, note 76 supra.
83
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organization or association. Race discrimination by
an employer may reasonably be deemed more unfair
and less excusable than discrimination against workers
86
on the ground of union affiliation.
The NLRB has held that employer interference with such pro87
tected concerted activities constitutes an unfair labor practice.
Recently, the District of Columbia Circuit has affirmed this
position, in Western Addition Community Organization v. NLRB
(Emporium),8 8 where employees bypassed the union grievance
procedure to picket in protest of employer discrimination. Although the court accepted the trial examiner's findings that the
actions of the employees were "'inconsistent with and disruptive of' the procedures for settling grievances under the collective bargaining agreement, ' 89 the court held that the exclusivity
principle of section 9(a) did not apply. The court read Title VII
into the NLRA and held that because this concerted action was
protected under Title VII it could not be punished under the
NLRA. 90 In support, the Emporium court used the Supreme
Court's observation in Southern Steamship Co. v. NLRB:
[T]he Board has not been commissioned to effectuate
the policies of the Labor Relations Act so single-mindedly that it may wholly ignore other and equally important Congressional objectives. Frequently the entire scope of Congressional purpose calls for careful
accommodation of one statutory scheme to another,
and it is not too much to demand of an administrative body that it undertake this accommodation without excessive emphasis on its immediate task. 9 1
New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U.S. 552, 561 (1938).
87Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd., 148 N.L.R.B. 1402 (1964), remanded, 349 F.2d 1 (9th
Cir. 1965), orig. decision aff'd., 166 N.L.R.B. 551 (1967), remanded, 419 F.2d 216 (9th
Cir. 1969). When the case came before the court for the second time, it held again that
concerted activity lost its § 7 protection when that activity violated § 9's exclusivity principle, because § 9 was controlling over § 7. In this case, however, the employer had failed
to warn the protesting employees that it objected to their picketing and would insist on
dealing only with the union. The court suggested that the Board might find that the
employer thereby waived its right to object and made § 7 operative again. Presumably, if
the employer had warned the employees of his insistence on § 9, the employees could
have been fired for protesting against racial discrimination!
88 485 F.2d 917 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 415 U.S. 913 (1974).
189 Id.at 923.
90 Id. at 928-29:
Where, as here, both the subject matter of the concerted activity and the right
to engage in such activity are safeguarded by legislation, we feel such concerted
activity cannot be treated identically with other concerted activity which is not
so safeguarded for the purpose of determining whether it so violated section
9(a) as to lose section 7 protection.
91 316 U.S. 31, 47 (1942).
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The court in Emporium reasoned that the underlying premise of
the exclusivity principle, majority rule, is not applicable in racial
discrimination cases, because such discrimination is illegal under Title VII and is not a matter for disposition by the union,
even by majority choice.9 2 Thus, said the court, "the Labor
Board should inquire . . .whether the union was actually remedying the discrimination to the fullest extent possible, by the most
expedient and efficacious means. Where the union's efforts fall
short of this high standard, the minority group's
concerted ac' 93
tivities cannot lose its [sic] section 7 protection.
2. Race Discriminationas an Unfair Labor Practice
If Title VII can be incorporated into the NLRA, several
additional and nonexclusive remedies become available to ameliorate many of the tensions between seniority and equal employment opportunity outlined in section II of this Comment.
In 1962 the NLRB took a more aggressive stance in this direction: Miranda Fuel Co. 9 4 decided that discriminatory conduct by
a union against member-employees was both a union and an
employer unfair labor practice. 95 The Board reasoned that
among an employee's section 7 rights was the right to be fairly
represented, without discrimination, by his exclusive bargaining agent. 96 The union that did not fairly represent the employees thus violated the Act and caused the employer to violate the
Act as well. 9 7 The Second Circuit, with three separate opinions,
denied enforcement, 9 8 holding that the Board cannot find a
section 7 violation unless the discrimination was deliberately designed to encourage or discourage union membership. In Local
12, United Rubber Workers9 9 the NLRB repeated its position that
a union's violation of its duty to represent fairly was an unfair
labor practice, and ruled that the duty could be breached by inaction, that is, the failure or refusal to process a grievance. 10 0
92 485

F.2d at 928-29.
93 Id. at 931 (emphasis in original).
94 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963). Miranda
Fuel involved a white employee whose seniority standing had been lowered by the employer on the demand of the union, because the employee had taken an early leave of
absence in violation of union policy. The Board read the § 9 duty of fair representation
into § 7.
95The Board found union violations under 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2) and employer
violations under 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3). 140 N.L.R.B. at 190.
96Id.at 185. See Comment, The Civil Rights Potential of the Labor Management Relations Act: The Current Approach, 12 DUQUESNE L. REv. 23, 27 (1973).
97 140 N.L.R.B. at 185-86.
98326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963) (2-1 decision).
99150 N.L.R.B. 312 (1964), enforced, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 837 (1967).
10Id. Employees had raised grievances that racial discrimination existed in the
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The Board's view of the union unfair practice was supported
and enforced by the Fifth Circuit.' 0 a The court rejected the
claim that Title VII provided the only remedies for labor union
discrimination, citing the rejection of the Tower amendment,
which would have made Title VII the exclusive means for enforcing the rights10 of
equal employment opportunity, in support
2
of its conclusion.
The 1969 decision by the District of Columbia Circuit in
United Packinghouse Workers v. NLRB1 0 3 went further than either
Miranda Fuel or Rubber Workers by holding that an employer,
acting independently of the union, commits an unfair labor
practice when he engages in racially discriminatory practices
and when he refuses to bargain about them. The court held
that such a refusal would interfere with section 7 rights by inhibiting employees "from asserting themselves against their
employer to improve their lot."'0 4 The court found:
that an employer's invidious discrimination on account
of race or national origin has such an effect. This effect is twofold: (1) racial discrimination sets up an unjustified clash of interests between groups of workers
which tends to reduce the likelihood and the effectiveness of their working in concert to achieve their
legitimate goals under the Act; and (2) racial discrimination creates in its victims an apathy or docility which
inhibits them from asserting their rights against the
perpetrator of the discrimination. We find that the
confluence of these two factors sufficiently deters the exercise of Section 7 rights as to violate Section 8(a)(1). 10 5
maintenance of separate seniority lists, segregated recreational activities, and racially
segregated plant facilities. The union refused to process and actively opposed these
grievances and grievances regarding back pay (for the layoff period) occasioned by application of the seniority system. Id. at 316-19. The union was found to have violated §§
8(b)(1)(A), (2), and (3). The Supreme Court approved the NLRB's position in Vaca v.
Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 181-83 (1967).
101386 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967). The court expressly
did not consider the Board's finding of violations of §§ 8(a)(2) & (3).
102 110 CONG. REc. 13650-52 (1964). The Tower amendment was rejected by a vote
of 59 to 29.
103 416 F.2d 1126 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 903 (1969).
104 Id. at 1135. The employer had allegedly classified workers into three categories
(blacks, Mexicans, and whites) and had given the better and higher salaried jobs to the
whites. When the union asked for a seniority system that would provide for open bidding on jobs the employer allegedly refused to bargain about it. On remand the Board
ordered a factual hearing and stated that it would not decide, as the court had, whether
employer discrimination would constitute an 8(a)(1) violation as a matter of law. Farmers'
Cooperative Compress, 72 L.R.R.M. 1251 (1969). After the hearing, the Board concluded that the record did not support a finding of invidious racial discrimination by
the employer. Farmers' Cooperative Compress, 194 N.L.R.B. 85 (1971).
105416 F.2d at 1135 (emphasis in original).
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The NLRB, however, mindful of the nonenforcement order in
Miranda Fuel, refused to follow this theory in Jubilee Manufacturing Co. 106 It was argued there that the employer's job classification system and bidding system resulted in discrimination
against women, who were generally found in the lower paying
classifications. The Board rejected the argument that discrimination on the basis of race or sex was a per se violation of the
NLRA because it could not consider such discrimination "inherently destructive" of employee section 7 rights.'0 7 The
Board dismissed the complaint. The Board's theory of 8(a)(1),
following that of the Second Circuit in Miranda Fuel, was that
some nexus had to be established between the discrimination
and employee section 7 rights. The Board also dismissed the
8(a)(5) charge on the ground that the evidence was insufficient
to establish the employer's refusal to bargain about alleged sex
discrimination. Thus Jubilee signals a refusal on the part of the
Board fully to incorporate Title VII rights into employees' section 7 rights so that any discrimination on the part of an employer or a union would be remediable under the NLRA. 0 8 Although it has been argued that this approach is correct' 0 9
because Congress did not intend the NLRA to be a general civil
rights act, and because the EEOC has greater expertise than the
Board in these matters, the decision in Mansion House 1 0 sheds
doubt on the correctness, if not the validity, of the Jubilee decision.
B.

NLRB v. Mansion House: A Frameworkfor NLRB
Considerationof Employment Discrimination
The issue framed by the Eighth Circuit in Mansion House"'
was "[w]hether or not the National Labor Relations Board may
require an employer to bargain with a labor organization if
that organization practices racial discrimination in its member-

10682 L.R.R.M. 1482 (1973).
107 82 L.R.R.M. at 1484.
101
See notes 125-37 infra & accompanying text. It has been suggested that courts
may distinguish Packinghouse Workers from Jubilee because the former involved racial
discrimination and the latter involved sex discrimination. The theory is that although
sex discrimination is illegal and resembles racial discrimination in the first part of the
Packinghouse Workers court's twofold effect, note 105 supra & accompanying text, it does
not create the same "docility" in its victims. Comment, supra note 96, at 33-34. Although
most discrimination cases brought to the Board have been racial, this Comment argues
that sex discrimination is equally likely to have a divisive effect on employees' ability to
act in concert in accordance with their § 7 rights.
109 Comment, supra note 96; Note, The Impact of De Facto Discrimination by Unions
on the Availability of NLRB BargainingOrders, 47 S. CAL L. REv. 1353 (1974).
110 473 F.2d 471 (8th Cir. 1973).
111 Id.
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ship." 112 The court held that the fifth amendment of the Constitution, which encompasses the equal protection guarantee in
the due process clause, prohibits any governmental agency
from discriminating on the basis of race, color, or religion. The
court went on to state that "[w]hen a governmental agency recognizes such a union [one which discriminates] to be the bargaining representative it ... becomes a willing participant in the

union's discriminatory practices."' "1 3 Aside from its action as a
government instrumentality, the NLRB, in seeking judicial enforcement of its bargaining order, was attempting to procure
an unconstitutional judicial enforcement of private discrimination. 1 4 The court concluded that the racial discrimination allegedly practiced by a union seeking certification or recognition as a bargaining agent under the NLRA was a proper area
of inquiry for the Board when the defense was appropriately
raised in a refusal to bargain case. The court deferred to the
Board in fleshing out standards for what would be a good faith,
rather than a pretextual, defense." 5 The court ruled that, in
considering the claim of racial discrimination, the Administrative Law Judge had erroneously excluded statistical evidence of
discrimination in the union's membership. The court cited
several Title VII cases" 6 to support the proposition that statistics could make out a prima facie case of discrimination. The
court concluded that the remedial machinery of the
NLRA
7
could not be available to unions which discriminated."
The significance of this decision should not be underestimateQ. Although it could be argued that Jubilee" 8 is not subject
to the same requirements as Mansion House, since the former involved no affirmative governmental action in support of discrimination, such an argument should be rejected, if not from
constitutional necessity, 1 9 then from general policy. Mansion
House now requires the Board to investigate the alleged discriminatory practices of the parties before it in a refusal to bargain proceeding since it cannot constitutionally grant a remedy
112Id. at 472 (footnote omitted).
113
Id.at 473.
11 See Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1
(1948).

115473 F.2d at 474-75.
116E.g., Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970); Jones

v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 954
(1971).
117A possible corollary of this decision is that the remedial machinery of the NLRA

could not be made available to an employer who discriminates.
"" 82 L.R.R.M. 1482 (1973).
119It has been argued that in certain contexts state inaction is the equivalent of

state action. Hawkins v. Shaw, 461 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1972).
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to a discriminatory union or employer. But, by refusing to
grant a remedy in an unfair labor practice proceeding based on
a claim of racial discrimination, the Board may be encouraging
discrimination in much the same way as it would if it were to
grant a remedy in a refusal to bargain case. Since the Board has
held in Local 12, United Rubber Workers120 that a union's inaction
-failure to process a grievance-can be a violation of the duty
of fair representation,' 2 ' it is inconsistent for the Board to hold
that its own inactibn does not contribute to the union's or employer's discrimination. Thus, the Mansion House rationale
should force the NLRB to recognize discrimination by the employer or union as an unfair labor practice so the Board, by
withholding a remedy, does not "participate" in the discrimina22
tion.'
Furthermore, whatever arguments can be made to support
the result in Jubilee do not survive Mansion House. In deciding
whether to issue a bargaining order the NLRB must look to the
facts of the alleged racial discrimination and is therefore necessarily involved in the same analysis under Title VII which it
sought to avoid in Jubilee. In addition, the Eighth Circuit has
suggested in Mansion House that the Board must use the same
standards as those in Title VII-for example, statistical evidence must be admitted for purposes of establishing a prima
facie case of discrimination. 23 Since the NLRB already considers racial discrimination in so many contexts, 24 an examination of a union's or employer's discrimination will generally be
no harder in the unfair labor practice context than in any of the
others.
Several cases recently decided by the NLRB indicate that
the Board (no majority opinion existed in the three cases) has
accepted a very limited view of the Eighth Circuit's Mansion
House rule. In Bekins Moving & Storage Co.' 2 5 the Board held
that it would permit a postelection, precertification attack on
the victorious union by the employer where the employer alleged discrimination on the part of the union. The plurality
opinion, written by Members Miller and Jenkins, based the decision on constitutional necessity: following the reasoning of
120 See text accompanying notes 99-102 supra.
121Local 12, United Rubber Workers, 150 N.L.R.B. 312 (1964), enforced, 368 F.2d 12
(5th Cir. 1966); Hughes Tool Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964).
122 See NLRB v. Longshoremen, Local 1581, 489 F.2d 635 (5th Cir. 1974) (union
that induced employer to give preference to workers on basis of national origin violated
8(b)(2)). Significantly, the Board's order required the union to cease and desist from
causing the employer to violate 8(a)(3).
123For a discussion of this point, see text accompanying note 116 supra.
124For a discussion of this point, see text accompanying notes 85-105 supra.
12586 L.R.R.M. 1323.(1974).
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Mansion House, the NLRB, as a federal agency, could not entangle itself in unconstitutional discrimination by certifying
a discriminatory union without running afoul of the equal protection guarantee of the due process clause of the fifth amendment. The Board was rather cautious in its discussion of unlawful discrimination, stating that while it must interpret its own
Act "with due regard for Federal policy against racial or other
arbitrary or invidious discrimination" it would not "usurp the
functions which Congress entrusted to the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission."'12 6 Thus, the Board will enter the
area of alleged employment discrimination only in the clear
cases of constitutional violation, not simply Title VII violation:
"It is not our intention.., to regard every possible alleged violation of Title VII, for example, as grounds for refusing to is127
sue a certificate."'
One obvious difficulty with this position is the current
status of sex discrimination under the Constitution. Sex classifications, under traditional equal protection analysis, are not
suspect 12 8 but are "inherently invidious."'12 9 The status of a
sex discriminating union asking for certification might thus
be different than a racially discriminating union. 30 Furthermore, the Bekins decision refused to come to grips with the
standards to be applied to determine if discrimination does in
fact exist:
[W]e have concluded that we are not yet sufficiently
experienced in this newly developing area of the law to
enable us to codify, at this time, our approach to such
issues, either procedurally or substantively. We also
believe that the parties are entitled to judicial review of
our determinations as to the proper scope of our duty
and authority to conform our own law and procedure to the requirements of both the Constitution
and legislation against invidious discrimination in
3
employment.' 1
Following the Board's decision in Bekins these two problem areas were further complicated by decisions in Bell &
Howell Co.' 32 and Grant's Furniture Plaza.' 33 In Bell & Howell the
12 6

1d. at 1325.
12 7 Id. at 1326.
128 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
2
1 9Id
at 682; Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
130 See notes 132-36 infra & accompanying text. Ironically, Bekins itself involved al-

leged sex discrimination.
13186
13287
13387

L.R.R.M. at 1327.
L.R.R.M. 1172 (1974).
L.R.R.M. 1175 (1974).
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Board certified a union alleged to be discriminating on the basis
of sex because sex was not a suspect class under the Constitution 1 34 and since the area was new and the Board was unfamiliar
with proper standards and procedures it would refuse to certify
"only in areas of most egregious discrimination"--that is, constitutionally suspect classes. Obviously, one very important
form of employment discrimination under Title VII, sex dis135
crimination, is not being remedied under NLRB procedures.
In Grant's Furniture the Board certified a union over employer objection that it discriminated on the basis of sex and
Spanish surname, holding that statistical evidence of an "affirmative factual nature" would be required to sustain such a
certification objection. This decision seems to reject the Title
VII standards of proof for employment discrimination as sup136
ported by the Mansion House court.
Thus, to summarize the effect of these recent opinions, it
seems that the NLRB has accepted the Mansion House rationale
in Bekins in constitutionally limiting its own power to give remedies to discriminatory unions, but has refused to use Title VII
standards to define "discrimination," and most certainly has refused to read into the NLRA the standards or requirements of
Title VII. 13 7 The Board's reluctance in this area should not be

construed as correct or even wise. The Board's stated reasons
for its positions are that it cannot encroach upon the functions
of another agency, the EEOC. But what the Board fails to consider is that by adopting Title VII standards it will be more efficient in dealing with these cases, since it will not have to fashion
procedural rules and substantive standards in a case-by-case
manner. The Board, instead of usurping another agency's
function, would be supplementing it, providing additional,
cumulative means for the enforcement of Title VII without
contravening any of the policies of its own Act.
134 Geduldig

v. Aiello, 94 S. Ct. 2485 (1974).
Perhaps one could make out a case for NLRB discrimination against women in
light of the Board's refusal to remedy sex-related problems and its willingness to remedy other forms of discrimination.
136 The Eighth Circuit in Mansion House relied on Parham v. Southwestern Bell
Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970) (a Title VII case), for the proposition that statistical evidence was relevant and sufficient in a finding of union discrimination precluding certification of that union by the NLRB. See also Defender Security Services, 86
L.R.R.M. 1490 (1974), where the Board rejected an employer's attempt to raise claims
of union discrimination at the pre~lection stage. The Board made it clear that it would
require a high degree of proof before it would hold a hearing on an employer's claim of
union discrimination.
137 This area is still in great flux and can be considered still open since there was
no majority opinion and Member Miller is leaving the Board in 1975.
135
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C. Reading Title VII into Section 7
Whether or not the exact rationale of Packinghouse138 is
used, section 7 of the NLRA could be read to incorporate the
Title VII rights of equal employment opportunity so that any
discrimination on the part of the employer or union would be
an unfair labor practice because it would be an interference
with those section 7 rights. Recalling the analysis of the District
of Columbia Circuit in Emporium,139 in which concerted action
protesting racial discrimination was held protected under section 7 because protected under Title VII, it is difficult to understand how the Board can refuse to find discrimination a per se
violation of section 8 of the NLRA.
There are two possible rationales for finding employment
discrimination a violation of the NLRA. The first, which is essentially the rationale of Packinghouse, applies particularly well
in the context of seniority. So long as either the employer or the
union bargains for, or operates with, a seniority plan that discriminates between blacks and whites, or women and men, a
wedge will be driven between these two, or four, groups of
workers that effectively destroys the communality of their interests in concerted action and collective bargaining. While
some distinctions between workers do exist and do serve to destroy unity of interest, discrimination based on race or sex is unlawful and, therefore, cannot be used for such purposes. Second, in the context of sections 8(a)(5) and 8(b)(3) the duty to
bargain "in good faith" may be read to mean "in compliance with
the law"-including Tide VII. Employees' Title VII rights
would be adequately protected in this process since "[t]he rights
assured by Title VII . . . [cannot] be bargained away-either by
140
a union, by an employer, or by both acting in concert."'
Thus, using the NLRA as a mechanism for enforcing equal
opportunity rights would be consistent with Title VII, 14 ' with
the national labor policy, and would avoid the inevitable conflicts between the two acts. For example, where a union bargains for a seniority plan that may be in violation of Tide VII
the validity of the plan could be tested, prior to its implementation, in a refusal to bargain complaint brought by the union.
138416 F.2d 1126 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 903 (1969); cf. International
Builders, 204 N.L.R.B. No. 32 (1973).
139485 F.2d 917 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. granted sub nom. Emporium Capwell Co. v.
Western Addition Community Org., 415 U.S. 913 (1974).
"0 Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1971), petitionfor cert.
dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1972).
141Note 43 supra.
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Similarly, if section 7 is read to include Title VII equal employ-

ment rights, a discriminatory discharge could be handled by an

agency already expert in handling of section 8(a)(3) cases. 14 2 By
using these mechanisms the NLRA, as enforced by the NLRB,

could force employers and unions to draw up collective bargaining agreements that would require nondiscriminatory employment practices and could provide an additional mechanism
for their enforcement. If Mansion House requires the Board to
withhold its remedies from discriminatory unions and employers, the Board should not be permitted to withhold its remedies
when it could prevent such discrimination.
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.: The Distinctions
Between Arbitration and NLRB Action
The Supreme Court held in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Co. 143 that an arbitrator's finding of no discrimination could not
bar a Title VII lawsuit and that very little deference need be
given to the arbitrator's decision in such a lawsuit because the
congressional policy of Title VII vested final responsibility for
the enforcement of its provisions in the federal courts. 1 44 The
Court also held that the statutory scheme would not permit an
election of remedies doctrine to be applied in this area. Although it might be contended that the decision in Alexander
forecloses NLRB consideration of Title VII issues, careful
analysis of the Alexander opinion reveals that it actually lends
D.

142 For a discussion of the apparent difference between the 8(a)(3) standard, which
is sometimes said to require a finding of intent, and the Title VII standard, which does
not, and a conclusion that the difference is more "apparent" than real, see Comment,
supra note 96, at 43-44. But cf. Tipler v. E.I. duPont deNemours & Co., 443 F.2d 125
(6th Cir. 1971).
143 415 U.S. 36 (1974). A discharged employee brought a grievance proceeding
contesting his discharge under the collective bargaining agreement without making an
explicit claim of racial discrimination until the final prearbitration stage. (The collective
bargaining agreement contained a general no-discrimination clause.) The arbitrator
ruled that the employee had been discharged for just cause without making reference
to the petitioner's claim of racial discrimination. The employee then filed a Title VII
lawsuit, after receiving his right-to-sue letter from the EEOC, which was dismissed by
the district court on the ground that the claim of racial discrimination had been submitted to and adversely decided by the arbitrator. The Alexander decision finally resolved an issue which had received disparate treatment in the circuits. See Oubichon v.
North Am. Rockwell Corp., 482 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1973); Rios v. Reynolds Metals Co.,
467 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1972); Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970),
aff'd without opinion by an equally divided Court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971); Hutchings v. United
States Indus., Inc., 428 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1970); Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416
F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969). See also Gould, Labor Arbitration of Grievances Involving Racial
Discrimination, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 40 (1969); Platt, The Relationship Between Arbitration
and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 3 GA. L. REv. 398 (1969); NoteJudicialDeference to Arbitrators'Decisions in Title VII Cases, 26 STAN. L. REV. 421 (1974).
144 415 U.S. at 44.
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support to a proposal for increasing NLRB involvement in the
employment discrimination field.
The Alexander Court was concerned with the fact that arbitrators generally apply the "common law of the shop" formalized in the contract and do not have the authority to invoke the
public "law of the land" which might conflict with the bargain
reached by the parties. 14 5 These considerations do not apply to
the NLRB since it has a duty to enforce federal laws' 4 6 and cannot, under Mansion House, participate in racial discrimination by
compromising a grievance. The Court also refused to let an arbitrator's decision preclude a Title VII lawsuit because the national labor policy expressed in the Steelworkers Trilogy' 47 would
have required the courts to give great deference to the arbitrator's award, in order to ensure the effectiveness of the arbitration clause as an instrument for preserving "labor peace." This
would violate the policy behind Title VII requiring the federal
courts to be the final interpreters of Title VII law. Having the
NLRB litigate and consider Title VII issues would not violate
this policy. All NLRB decisions are reviewable by the circuit
courts of appeal, 48 as are NLRB enforcement orders, 49 so that
the federal courts would rule on the Title VII issues decided by
the NLRB.' 50 Thus, Alexander does nothing to foreclose NLRB
consideration of employment discrimination issues. There is
none of the danger of compromise that exists in arbitration
since a governmental agency cannot be a party to discrimina5
tion under Mansion House. '
At least one other federal court has imposed the law of
Title VII on the labor arbitration process to the extent of upholding an employer refusal to arbitrate a seniority grievance
4-5Id. at 53.

For a discussion of this point see text accompanying note 92 supra. "[T]he Board
has an obligation in construing the acts which it administers to recognize and sometimes
reconcile coexisting and perhaps inconsistent policies embodied in other legislation."
Western Addition Community Org. v. NLRB, 485 F.2d 917, 927 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert.
denied sub nom., Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 415
141

U.S. 913 (1974).
147See

text accompanying note 30 supra.
An interesting question which the Alexander case poses for labor law in general is
that, given this one exception to the deference traditionally shown arbitration, other
policies might similarly be held to be sufficiently "paramount" to justify refusing deference to the arbitrator and further inroads would be made on the policy of finality of
the arbitration process.
14 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1970).
149 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1970).
150Obviously, the circuit court's decision would be as binding on the NLRB for
cases within that circuit as they would be on federal district courts in that circuit.
51 473 F.2d 471 (8th Cir. 1973). Arbitrators are chosen in a private process, by the
parties, to compromise their differences. The NLRB is a public agency with public obligations.
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when whites who were laid off under a new affirmative action
seniority plan had more departmental, but less plantwide, seniority than the blacks who were not laid off.1 52 The district
court held that the dispute was not arbitrable since the arbitrator had no power to alter a system commanded by the law of
Tide VII. Title VII and not the collective bargaining agreement, was held to govern the dispute.
Yet, even arbitration may be useful in resolving some Title
VII issues and it should not be conclusively ruled out of the
equal employment opportunity process if the paramount purpose of Title VII is to eliminate employment discrimination.
Arbitration can be a useful first step in a discrimination charge.
If the collective bargaining agreement contains a no-discrimination clause which tracks Title VII language a particular arbitrator may be willing to look to Title VII law.' 53 As long as a
particular claim is individual and not likely to involve large class
issues an arbitration award may be the most efficient and effective remedy. As long as the courts can still consider the matter
de novo after Alexander, 5 4 there need be no worry that a just
claim will go unremedied. Title VII encourages the "considera55
tion of employment-discrimination claims in several forums"'
because the elimination of employment discrimination is to be
56
given the "highest priority."'
Thus, reading Alexander, 15 7 Emporium,158 and Mansion
House' 5 9 together it can be concluded that Title VII is "preemptive" of any conflict it presents with the NLRA and it can,
by its incorporation into the NLRA, give new life to the NLRA
as a vehicle for enforcement of employment civil rights. if the
Emporium incorporation of Tide VII into section 7 is fully
adopted by the NLRB and the other circuits, NLRB involvement in employment discrimination will be vastly expanded.
160
Although this new NLRB function is not without problems
that must be resolved before the two acts can be worked into
a harmonious scheme of equal employment opportunity en152Savannah Printing, Local 604 v. Union Camp Corp., 350 F. Supp. 632 (S.D. Ga.

1972).
15

3 E.g., CLIO Education Ass'n, 61 Lab. Arb. 37 (1973). Under the Steelworkers

doctrine, text accompanying note 147 supra, arbitrators must "interpret" the contract and
can choose to do so by reading in the law.
154 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974). This could raise an interesting question whether the
employer would be entitled to a de novo hearing under Title VII, if he could argue that
the arbitrator, in finding against him, had not considered the law.
155 Id.
156Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968).
157 415 U.S. 36 (1974).

158485 F.2d 917 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 415 U.S. 913 (1974).
159 473 F.2d 471 (8th Cir. 1973).
.A0 See text accompanying notes 167-68 infra.
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forcement, this new function is certainly worth pursuing in
order to strengthen such enforcement.
IV.
TITLE

A FRAMEWORK FOR RECONCILING
AND THE NLRA TO PROMOTE LABOR PEACE
AND EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY

CONCLUSION:

VII

The National Labor Relations Act has been the instrument
for reconciling conflicts between employers and employees. Its
agency, the NLRB, has become expert in managing the tensions between two parties who frequently have competing interests. The Civil Rights Act protects the rights of individual employees to equal employment opportunity which brings those
employees into conflict with both employers and other employees. This Comment has explored how one of the interests of employees bargained for collectively, but intended to protect the
individual worker-seniority-may operate to deny some workers their rights under Title VII. It has been suggested that some
of the machinery of the NLRA could be used to help reconcile
these competing interests, rather than exacerbate them. Such
a proposal is not without its own difficulties, however, and before the NLRA can realize its full potential as a promoter of
employment civil rights,' 6 ' those difficulties will have to be
dealt with by Congress or the courts, with perhaps a major reassessment of national labor policy. The holding of Mansion
House may have already entangled the NLRB in employment
discrimination litigation. If so, the result is not entirely inconsistent with the NLRA's62 history as a watchdog over race relations in the labor field.'
The framework for reconciling the two Acts and for meeting the strict requirements of Title VII can be stated simply: If
the primary policy is the amelioration of discrimination in employment 163 then the most effective means should be used to
achieve that purpose. As long as there are several possible
ways to redress this problem and they can be made to supplement, rather than conflict with, each other, the law should favor
the use of many remedies. 164 The propriety of the NLRA as a
1"1 Others have made similar suggestions. B. MELTZER, LABOR LAW 908 (1970);
Cooper & Sobol, supra note 16 at 1679. Still others have argued vigorously against them.
Comment, supra note 96. One would guess that the NLRB might itself oppose such suggestions since it claims severe overwork already.
1612For a discussion of this history, see text accompanying notes 76-110 supra.
163 Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
14 Id. Potential conflicts in remedial approaches with the EEOC could be minimized
through the coordination of the Equal Employment Coordinating Council established
by § 10 of the 1972 Equal Employment Opportunity Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-14 (Supp.
II, 1972). The NLRB is not presently a member of this Council.
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mechanism for enforcing labor civil rights is suggested by three
sources: (1) the constitutional requirement of Mansion House,
(2) the history of NLRA involvement in race relations in the labor
field, and (3) federal court modification of collective bargaining
agreements bargained for under, and heretofore protected by,
16
the NLRA where those agreements conflict with Title VII.

Rather than waiting for a court challenge to a collective
bargaining agreement, the NLRB machinery can be used to
provide efficient and expert remedial and monitoring assistance to equal employment opportunity in two ways. First, since
collective bargaining agreements in violation of Title VII will
be struck down in later challenges, the NLRB can use its certification, election, 8(a)(5), and 8(b)(3) machinery to prevent
agreement to a contract that is in violation of the Act. Second,
the Board could utilize its unfair labor practice machinery to
provide affirmative relief for employment discrimination not
contained within a collective bargaining agreement, rather than
simply withholding remedies from a union or employer who
discriminates. 166
Several problems remain. First, the language of section 7
protects collective, not individual rights, so seniority systems
which do not have an adverse effect on an identifiable group of
workers may not be covered by the NLRA. This problem is met
by the fact that Title VII remains to protect all individual employment rights; 167 the NLRA is merely supplementary. Second, having the NLRB look into the substance of collective bargaining agreements is contrary to the governmental "hands-off"
68
policy articulated in the history and case law of the NLRA.1
Thus, a rethinking of national labor policy and priorities may
be necessary. Since the enactment of the NLRA the government has intruded into the labor-management relationship increasingly and the decision of Mansion House may signal increasing NLRB involvement in union and management areas
69
generally thought to be outside the realm of the NLRA.1
There is an even more compelling reason for NLRB involvement in the consideration of the substantive terms of the
165 For a further discussion, see text accompanying notes 44-46 supra.
166 If concerted activity on behalf of racial equality in employment is treated as a
protected activity under § 7, the Board could prevent a seniority plan which had a discriminatory impact from being agreed to. The "good faith" requirement of §§ 8(a)(5)
and 8(b)(3) could be read as coextensive with Title VII standards, allowing the NLRB
to require bargaining consistent with them.
167 Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
168E.g., Ex-Cell-O Corp., 185 N.L.R.B. 20 (1970), enforced, 449 F.2d 1058 (1971).
169Such involvement may eventually lead to a form of tri-partite bargaining, with
a government agency or minority group representative involved in the collective bargaining process in order to protect minority civil rights.
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collective bargaining agreement and employer and union discriminatory practices. While the employer-employee battleground may have subsided under the NLRA, a new battle
threatens to erupt-the result of black versus white employee
tensions. 170 It is possible that with some alteration in the focus
of national labor policy, the NLRA's procedures can be used to
avoid this eruption. When, in the case of seniority plans, groups
of white workers and groups of black workers are pitted against
each other, the bargaining and conciliation process, with Title
VII incorporated, can be used to promote labor peace in the
earliest stages of the process: before the contract is negotiated,
before layoffs occur, before racial tensions and backlash divide
the workplace, and before the time-consuming and expensive
process of settling these issues by means of lawsuits is begun.
This Comment has argued, in summary, that if employment discrimination is to be given the highest remedial priority,
many forums should be made available to those aggrieved.
Title VII precedent, however, has been inadequate to remedy
discrimination in the context of complex labor situations such
as seniority systems. The NLRB already has expertise in the
area of discriminatory discharges, and the Board could expand its role to encourage and provide mechanisms for reconciliation before racial tensions reach crisis proportions.
The policy is clear. Under Mansion House and Alexander the
goals of Title VII are of primary concern to our nation. With
the NLRB inevitably entwined in Title VII law 17 ' and the everpresent possibility of conflict in the two acts, the NLRB, consistent with Title VII, 1 72 could take a more aggressive role in the
area of civil rights in labor relations and thereby promote the
purposes of both Acts: labor peace and equal employment opportunity.
See Purcell & Rodgers, Young Black Workers Speak Their Minds, 14 CALIF. MANAGEREv., Summer 1972, at 45, 50, suggesting that racial tensions could affect the
efficiency of the plant where blacks felt discriminated against and whites felt that blacks
were getting preferential treatment.
1 See text accompanying notes 111-17 supra.
172 Using guidelines suggested by such cases as Mansion House, Emporium, and Alex1"0

MENT

ander, the NLRA could be used to supplement and complement Title VII by incorporating it and using its standards for finding employment discrimination.

